Abstract
The rapid growth of digital platforms has transformed competition policy by shifting market power from traditional price-based dominance to ecosystem-based, data-driven and network-effect-driven forms of control. This article develops an IMRAD-structured assessment of how abuse of dominant position in digital platforms can be identified, monitored and prevented in the regulatory environment of Uzbekistan. The article proposes a Dominance Monitoring Index (DMI), integrates it with a logit probability model, and connects the model with ex-ante notification, prohibited conduct catalogues and institutional monitoring. The methodological contribution is a practical framework that combines legal, economic and measurable indicators: revenue scale, active end users, active business users, direct and indirect network effects, data control, switching costs, ecosystem lock-in, multi-homing constraints and adjacent-market influence. The results show that a single turnover or market-share threshold is insufficient for digital-platform regulation; a composite index and risk-based monitoring system can better identify strategic platforms and prevent self-preferencing, tying, anti-steering, discriminatory access, data foreclosure and algorithmic opacity. The article concludes with policy proposals for Uzbekistan: differentiated platform categories, mandatory reporting for high-risk platforms, a catalogue of prohibited practices, interoperability obligations and an inter-agency digital monitoring module.
References
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