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GLOBAL INDICATORS OF INSOLVENCY-SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DURATION, COSTS, CREDITOR RECOVERY AND BUSINESS PRESERVATION

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Abstract

This article develops a comparative framework for evaluating the effectiveness of insolvency systems through four interdependent outcome dimensions: duration of proceedings, procedural costs, creditor recovery, and preservation of economically viable businesses. Particular attention is paid to the World Bank Business Ready (B-READY) 2025 methodology, which separates the quality of insolvency regulation, institutional and operational infrastructure, and the time and cost of in-court liquidation and reorganization. Uzbekistan is used as the principal national case. According to its B-READY 2025 profile, in-court liquidation is characterized by a duration of 8 months and costs equal to 15 per cent of the company's market value, while in-court reorganization takes 14 months and costs 12 per cent. The article argues that such figures should not be interpreted as a self-contained ranking of insolvency effectiveness. A fast liquidation can destroy going-concern value, while a longer reorganization may be economically justified if it increases net recovery and preserves productive activity. The study proposes a seven-component performance dashboard combining procedural speed, cost, net creditor recovery, going-concern preservation, predictability, distributional outcomes and post-proceeding viability. It concludes with data-governance and reform proposals for Uzbekistan and other jurisdictions seeking evidence-based insolvency policy.



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1. Introduction

The effectiveness of an insolvency regime cannot be inferred from the formal sophistication of its legislation alone. Two jurisdictions may have similar statutory mechanisms for liquidation, restructuring, creditor voting and judicial supervision, yet produce substantially different outcomes because of court specialization, practitioner capacity, information infrastructure, financing conditions, asset-market depth and the speed with which enterprise value deteriorates after financial distress becomes public. The relevant policy question is therefore not simply whether an insolvency procedure exists, but how quickly and predictably financial distress is resolved, at what cost, with what recovery for creditors and with what effect on productive business activity.¹

International benchmarking has historically sought indicators that permit cross-country comparison. The former Doing Business resolving-insolvency methodology focused on time, cost, outcome and a modelled recovery rate. The newer Business Ready (B-READY) framework is conceptually broader. Within Business Insolvency it separates the quality of regulation, the quality of public services and operational infrastructure, and operational efficiency; the latter includes the time and cost of in-court liquidation and reorganization. This architecture is important because creditor recovery is not determined by priority rules alone. It is also shaped by institutional capacity, case administration, valuation, access to information, the availability of rescue finance and the ability

¹UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law; World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes (2021).



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to sell assets without avoidable value loss.²

Uzbekistan provides a useful contemporary case. The Law “On Insolvency” adopted in 2022 modernized the national framework, while B-READY 2025 supplies an external benchmark for selected operational indicators. The World Bank profile records 8 months and costs of 15 per cent of company market value for in-court liquidation, and 14 months and costs of 12 per cent for in-court reorganization. These figures are informative, but they cannot answer the broader question of system effectiveness without evidence on distributions, going-concern preservation and post-restructuring survival. A faster liquidation is not necessarily superior if a viable enterprise is dismantled; conversely, additional time spent on a credible reorganization can be justified if it preserves a higher enterprise value and yields a better net outcome.³

The purpose of this article is to construct a multidimensional model for evaluating insolvency-system effectiveness that combines duration, cost, creditor recovery and business preservation. The central hypothesis is that a high-performing insolvency regime should minimize unnecessary value destruction rather than minimize calendar time as an end in itself. A meaningful benchmark should therefore distinguish productive procedural time from avoidable delay, measure recovery net of direct costs and the time value of money, separate liquidation from reorganization, and examine whether viable operations survive the proceeding.

²World Bank, Business Ready (B-READY) 2025, Business Insolvency Methodology.

³World Bank, B-READY 2025 – Uzbekistan: Business Insolvency Economy Profile: liquidation 8 months/15%; reorganization 14 months/12%.



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2. Materials and Methods

The study combines doctrinal, comparative and descriptive-quantitative methods. The normative materials include the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. LRU-763 “On Insolvency”, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, the World Bank–UNCITRAL Insolvency and Creditor Rights Standard and Directive (EU) 2019/1023. German, British and United States mechanisms are used as functional comparators for rescue, liquidation, creditor participation, plan confirmation, practitioner functions and judicial control rather than as sources of directly applicable law in Uzbekistan.⁴

The quantitative component relies principally on the B-READY 2025 Business Insolvency methodology and the corresponding Uzbekistan economy profile. B-READY organizes the topic through three pillars: quality of regulations governing judicial liquidation and reorganization; public services and operational infrastructure; and operational efficiency, including time and cost. The analysis deliberately does not merge historical Doing Business recovery-rate values with current B-READY data as if they were one continuous series, because the scenarios, methodology and indicator architecture are materially different.⁵

Four families of outcomes are distinguished. The first is procedural duration: the time between legally defined commencement and termination points, disaggregated by procedure and, where possible, by procedural stage. The second is procedural cost: direct and indirect expenses required to administer, finance, preserve, value and dispose of the estate or to negotiate and implement a reorganization. The third is creditor recovery: the economic value ultimately distributed to creditors, preferably measured by class and adjusted for costs and

⁴World Bank and UNCITRAL, Insolvency and Creditor Rights Standard; Directive (EU) 2019/1023.

⁵World Bank, B-READY 2025 Methodology Handbook – Business Insolvency.



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delay. The fourth is business preservation: whether economically viable operations, jobs, contracts and productive combinations of assets are preserved through reorganization or a going-concern sale. Company size, sector, asset specificity, leverage, creditor structure and macroeconomic conditions are treated as relevant confounding variables.

3. Results

3.1. Duration as an effectiveness indicator

Time is one of the most intuitive indicators of insolvency performance because delay can directly erode enterprise value. Inventory may depreciate, customers may migrate to competitors, key employees may leave, licenses may expire, suppliers may tighten terms and financing costs may increase. UNCITRAL and the World Bank therefore identify timely and efficient administration as central objectives of a sound insolvency framework. From this perspective, duration is not merely an administrative statistic; it is a variable that can change the distributable estate itself.⁶

A shorter procedure, however, is not automatically a better procedure. A liquidation completed in two months may destroy a viable production network, while a twelve-month reorganization may preserve the business and generate higher value for creditors. The analytical task is to distinguish necessary procedural time from dead time. Time spent on reliable valuation, preparation of a restructuring plan, creditor voting, rescue financing or a competitive going-concern sale may create or preserve value. Repeated adjournments, failed service, inactive intervals, duplicative verification and avoidable appeals ordinarily do not.

⁶UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law; World Bank Principles (2021).



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B-READY 2025 reports an 8-month period for in-court liquidation in Uzbekistan and 14 months for in-court reorganization. The six-month difference does not establish that reorganization is less efficient. Reorganization necessarily involves diagnosis, negotiation, plan design, creditor engagement and confirmation questions that may be absent from a straightforward liquidation. The policy-relevant question is whether the additional time produces additional preserved value. A mature performance system should therefore publish duration together with the procedural outcome and should disaggregate the total time into stages capable of institutional diagnosis.⁷

3.2. Procedural cost and net recovery

Procedural cost includes remuneration of insolvency practitioners, lawyers and advisers, court and administrative fees, valuation costs, sale expenses, preservation expenses, publication costs and, where relevant, the cost of interim or rescue financing. High fixed costs can make formal insolvency economically inaccessible for micro and small enterprises. This is one reason why UNCITRAL's Part Five and the World Bank Principles support simplified approaches for smaller debtors where proportionality can be maintained.⁸

For Uzbekistan, B-READY 2025 records liquidation costs equal to 15 per cent of company market value and reorganization costs equal to 12 per cent. The lower percentage for reorganization is noteworthy but should not be interpreted in isolation. A cost ratio does not reveal who bears the cost, when it is paid, what professional services it finances, whether it avoids larger losses, or whether going-concern value is preserved. A 12 per cent cost may be economically justified if it protects substantial enterprise value; even a 5 per cent cost can be

⁷World Bank, B-READY 2025 – Uzbekistan: Business Insolvency Economy Profile.

⁸UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Five; World Bank Principles (2021).



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excessive if the proceeding produces no meaningful distribution.⁹

Recovery should therefore be assessed in net rather than gross terms. Conceptually, net recovery starts with the value available for distribution, subtracts direct and identifiable indirect procedural costs, and then accounts for the economic effect of delayed distributions. This makes it possible to distinguish a fast but expensive process from a low-fee process that destroys value through delay. It also prevents cost reform from becoming an exercise in nominal fee reduction that undermines practitioner quality, valuation accuracy or competitive realization of assets.¹⁰

Table 1. Operational-efficiency indicators for Uzbekistan in B-READY 2025

Procedure	Duration (months)	Cost (% of company market value)
In-court liquidation	8	15
In-court reorganization	14	12

3.3. Measuring creditor recovery

Creditor recovery is an attractive outcome indicator, but a single aggregate percentage can conceal legally and economically important distributional differences. Secured creditors, employees, tax authorities, trade creditors and subordinated claimants may experience radically different outcomes under the same proceeding. Priority rules are themselves normative choices. Accordingly, system-level reporting should distinguish total estate realization from class-specific recovery and identify whether value was generated through piecemeal liquidation, a going-concern sale or a successful reorganization.

⁹World Bank, B-READY 2025 – Uzbekistan: Business Insolvency Economy Profile.

¹⁰Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer, “Debt Enforcement around the World,” *Journal of Political Economy* 116(6) (2008): 1105–1149.



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The former Doing Business methodology used a standardized hypothetical case to model recovery, which enhanced comparability but could not reproduce the distribution of outcomes in real insolvency cases. B-READY employs a different architecture, examining regulation, public services and operational efficiency. It is therefore methodologically unsound to combine indicators from different generations without adjustment and present the result as one continuous global ranking. Longitudinal research must make explicit where definitions and scenarios change.¹¹

The strongest empirical model would use case-level administrative data. For each completed case, a national system could record admitted claims by class, amounts and dates of distributions, proceeds from realization, going-concern sale value, total procedural costs, commencement and closure dates, number and duration of appeals, employment at commencement and closure, and whether the debtor or transferred business is operating after twelve and twenty-four months. Such data would permit calculation of medians, percentiles and class-specific outcomes rather than reliance on a single stylized company.

3.4. Business preservation as a separate performance dimension

Modern insolvency law does not require every legal entity to be preserved at any price. The object worth preserving is economically viable activity. A company may be liquidated as a legal shell while its operating business is sold as a going concern and preserved; conversely, a confirmed restructuring plan may merely postpone failure. Business-preservation indicators should therefore measure survival of productive operations rather than formal continuation of the same registration number.

¹¹World Bank, B-READY 2025 Methodology; its architecture differs from the discontinued Doing Business resolving-insolvency indicator.



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Preventive restructuring in the European Union, Chapter 11 in the United States, restructuring tools in the United Kingdom and the German StaRUG illustrate different institutional techniques for preserving viable enterprises before or during formal insolvency. Their legal designs differ substantially, but they share an economic concern with avoiding unnecessary liquidation of viable businesses while allowing non-viable firms to exit. Comparative assessment should therefore be functional: which mechanism identifies viability, imposes discipline on value allocation and produces a sustainable post-proceeding enterprise?¹²

A useful preservation measure should combine several variables: the share of reorganizations that result in confirmed and substantially implemented plans; the share of liquidations producing a going-concern sale; employment and operating-capacity preservation where data are legally available; and the survival of the reorganized or transferred business after twelve and twenty-four months. A nominal “rescue rate” without post-proceeding survival can reward plans that defer, rather than solve, insolvency.

3.5. The B-READY architecture: regulation, institutions and outcomes

The B-READY architecture is analytically valuable because it does not reduce insolvency to one outcome number. Business Insolvency is evaluated through regulation, public services and operational infrastructure, and operational efficiency. This reflects a causal logic: legal rights and procedures create the framework; institutions determine whether those rules can be used in practice; operational indicators show selected consequences of that interaction.¹³

For national reform, pillar-level results should be read diagnostically rather than as labels. Weak judicial specialization, limited practitioner oversight, incomplete

¹²Directive (EU) 2019/1023; U.S. Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11; UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020; German StaRUG.

¹³World Bank, Business Ready (B-READY) 2025, Business Insolvency Methodology.



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digital access, poor publication of insolvency information or slow case management may require different interventions even when the aggregate score appears similar. The principal value of benchmarking is therefore not the rank itself but its capacity to identify functions that should be examined against domestic case data.¹⁴

This distinction also affects reform sequencing. If delay is caused by valuation capacity, court workload or ineffective service, adding a new substantive provision may have little effect. Conversely, efficient courts cannot fully compensate for a statute that lacks workable restructuring tools, clear priorities or adequate safeguards. A high-performing system requires alignment among law, institutions, professional capacity and reliable information.

3.6. A seven-component insolvency performance dashboard

This article proposes a seven-component dashboard: (1) median liquidation duration; (2) median reorganization duration; (3) total direct procedural cost as a percentage of realizable enterprise or estate value; (4) net creditor recovery, both aggregate and by creditor class; (5) going-concern preservation through successful reorganization or going-concern sales; (6) predictability, measured through dispersion of time, cost and recovery; and (7) post-proceeding viability at twelve and twenty-four months. The dashboard is not presented as an official World Bank or UNCITRAL index. It is an analytical proposal designed to connect legal design with observable outcomes.¹⁵

Median values are generally preferable to simple averages for system management because a small number of very large or exceptionally complex cases can distort the mean. Dispersion is equally important. A regime in which

¹⁴World Bank, B-READY 2025 – Uzbekistan, Business Insolvency economy profile and pillar-level indicators.

¹⁵The seven-component dashboard is the author's analytical proposal and is not an official World Bank or UNCITRAL index.



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most cases close within six months but a substantial minority remain unresolved for five years creates legal uncertainty not visible in the median alone. Publication of the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles would therefore improve both policy diagnosis and market predictability.

Liquidation and reorganization should be reported separately. Combining them into a single “insolvency time” or “insolvency cost” obscures differences in objectives and procedural complexity. An advanced system should be evaluated through two sequential questions: does it channel distressed firms into the economically appropriate procedure, and does it then administer that procedure efficiently and fairly? The first question concerns sorting and viability; the second concerns execution.

3.7. Uzbekistan: interpreting the 2025 benchmark

The reported 8-month liquidation period offers a concrete starting point for domestic case-flow research. The next step is to determine how much of that period is attributable to commencement, claim verification, valuation, sale, distribution, appeals and formal closure. Without stage-level data, reform may target the wrong bottleneck. A digital case-management dataset should therefore decompose total duration into legally meaningful intervals and identify inactive periods separately from necessary adjudicative or commercial activity.

The reported 15 per cent liquidation cost and 12 per cent reorganization cost should likewise be decomposed. Practitioner remuneration, valuation, sale commissions, legal representation, publication, preservation and rescue financing have different policy implications. Some expenditure protects or creates value; some represents avoidable friction. Cost reform should aim to remove unnecessary friction without reducing professional competence or incentives to maximize estate value.



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The 14-month reorganization period cannot be evaluated without outcome data. If a substantial proportion of reorganized firms remain viable after two years and net creditor value exceeds the realistic liquidation alternative, the additional time may be justified. If most firms subsequently fail and enter liquidation, the procedure may merely postpone exit. The absence of publicly available post-reorganization survival statistics is therefore not a minor data issue; it limits the capacity to distinguish effective rescue from delayed liquidation.

3.8. Methodological limits of cross-country comparison

The first difficulty in comparing insolvency statistics across jurisdictions is that identical labels may conceal different legal processes. “Reorganization” may refer to a court-confirmed plan procedure in one system and a hybrid or partly out-of-court mechanism in another. “Liquidation” may include piecemeal sale, going-concern sale or simplified closure. Comparative datasets should therefore harmonize procedures by function, commencement point and legal endpoint rather than by title alone.¹⁶

A second problem is case mix. Large industrial enterprises, microbusinesses, assetless shell companies and regulated financial firms can generate radically different durations and costs. Aggregating them into one national average can create misleading conclusions. Sound benchmarking should stratify at least by debtor size, estate value and procedure type, while reporting medians and percentiles rather than relying only on arithmetic means.

A third limitation is the macroeconomic environment. Recession can depress asset demand, increase financing costs and expand judicial caseloads. A one-year country score cannot therefore be attributed entirely to legal design. More reliable

¹⁶UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law; World Bank Principles (2021), comparative functional approach to insolvency procedures.



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empirical evaluation uses multi-year cohorts and examines trends before and after specific reforms, while controlling as far as possible for major economic shocks.

3.9. Institutional capacity of courts and insolvency practitioners

Actual duration is often determined less by statutory deadlines than by case-management quality and professional capacity. Specialized judges may resolve valuation disputes, creditor classification, avoidance actions and restructuring-feasibility issues more consistently. Specialization alone is not sufficient, however; workload, assignment rules, electronic filing, reasoned decisions and appellate consistency also affect performance.

The insolvency practitioner has a direct role in preserving estate value. Poorly designed remuneration can create distorted incentives: compensation linked only to asset sales may under-reward rescue, while purely time-based compensation may weaken incentives for timely completion. The World Bank and UNCITRAL standards emphasize competence, independence, accountability and predictable remuneration as important components of institutional quality.¹⁷

A national dashboard can therefore include selected practitioner-system indicators such as caseload, median duration, realized value relative to defensible valuation ranges, substantiated complaints, disciplinary outcomes and continuing professional education. These indicators should be used to identify systemic capacity constraints, not to produce simplistic league tables of individual practitioners.

¹⁷World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes (2021); UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.



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3.10. Digitalization, asset realization and recovery

Digital filing and electronic case management are more than administrative conveniences. Electronic creditor registers, automated notifications, online document access and scheduling can reduce transaction costs and service delay. Digital systems also create the structured event data required for credible statistics. If commencement, procedural events, distributions and closure are not captured in machine-readable form, performance measurement will remain expensive and incomplete.

Asset-sale infrastructure similarly affects recovery. Competitive electronic auctions can widen the bidder pool for standardized assets, but they do not necessarily maximize value for a complex going-concern business. Business sales may require due diligence, confidentiality, transitional contracts, sector approvals and acquisition financing. The realization method should therefore be proportionate to the asset and transaction rather than dictated by a single universal channel.¹⁸

For Uzbekistan, the next stage of digitalization could move beyond electronic submission toward an analytics-ready insolvency database. If court information, practitioner records and realization data share a common case identifier, duration, cost and recovery indicators can be calculated from administrative records rather than reconstructed manually after the event.

3.11. The trade-off between creditor recovery and business preservation

Maximum short-term recovery and maximum business preservation do not necessarily coincide in every case. A secured creditor may prefer an immediate asset sale that produces a high private recovery while destroying supplier

¹⁸World Bank Principles (2021), principles on preservation and realization of estate value; UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.



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relationships, employment or organizational capital. The extent to which insolvency law should internalize such externalities is a normative policy question, but performance reporting should at least make the trade-off visible.

The economic case for reorganization depends on the difference between realistic liquidation value and expected reorganization value. If going-concern value is credibly higher and plan risk is allocated within legally defensible constraints, rescue may increase collective value. If projected value rests on unsupported optimism, restructuring can merely delay recognition of loss. Feasibility review and a liquidation or best-interest benchmark therefore connect procedural safeguards with economic performance.¹⁹

Employment preservation alone is not a sufficient proxy for business survival. Revenue continuity, customer retention, tax payments, supplier continuity and operating capacity may also be relevant. Because data collection creates privacy and administrative costs, however, a national system should begin with a limited set of objectively verifiable core indicators and expand only when data quality is stable.

4.5. A staged empirical-research model for Uzbekistan

A first stage could construct an anonymized administrative dataset covering completed insolvency cases over the previous three to five years. Each case would record procedure type, debtor-size band, commencement and closure, admitted claims, realization proceeds, total procedural cost and legal outcome. This would create a domestic baseline and allow standardized B-READY indicators to be interpreted alongside the distribution of actual national cases.

A second stage should capture stage-level time: claim verification, valuation,

¹⁹UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law; comparative restructuring standards concerning feasibility and creditor protection.



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asset realization, plan preparation and voting, appeals and distribution. The purpose is to determine where the aggregate eight- or fourteen-month period is generated. Reform can then target the actual bottleneck rather than merely changing an overall statutory deadline.

A third stage should measure outcome quality through class-specific recovery, going-concern sales, approved and substantially implemented plans, and twelve- and twenty-four-month survival. Such evidence would move insolvency policy from a procedural question—how many cases were closed—to an economic and legal question—how much value was preserved, how predictably and for whom.²⁰

4. Discussion

4.1. The risk of one-dimensional rankings

A speed-only ranking can reward premature closure. A recovery-only ranking can overemphasize outcomes for secured creditors while concealing procedural fairness and the position of junior creditors. A rescue-rate ranking can encourage preservation of non-viable “zombie” firms. Any global index embodies normative choices about which values count and how they are weighted. A balanced scorecard is therefore preferable because it keeps efficiency, value maximization, distribution and procedural legitimacy analytically visible.

The strength of the UNCITRAL and World Bank standards is precisely that they treat insolvency as an institutional system rather than as a single number. National performance management should follow the same logic. Courts and administrators should not be instructed simply to reduce duration; they should reduce avoidable delay while maintaining due process and preserving

²⁰The proposed staged empirical model is the author's analytical proposal based on the performance dimensions examined in this study.



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economically justified value.²¹

4.2. Recovery and the time value of money

Two creditors receiving the same nominal percentage at different dates do not obtain the same economic outcome. Delayed distributions create financing and opportunity costs, particularly for small trade creditors that may themselves be liquidity-constrained. A rigorous recovery statistic should therefore discount distributions to present value or, at minimum, report nominal recovery together with distribution timing.²²

A national statistical system need not begin with a complex discount model. Recording payment dates and amounts is the essential first step. Researchers and policymakers can then calculate nominal and discounted recovery using transparent assumptions. The institutional priority is reliable case-level data from which alternative analytical measures can be derived.

4.3. Data governance, transparency and comparability

Global benchmarking requires comparable definitions. Commencement, closure, reorganization success, procedural cost and recovery must be coded consistently. Courts, insolvency practitioners and competent administrative bodies should use common data fields. Personal data and commercially sensitive information can be protected while anonymized aggregate and cohort statistics are published for policy and research purposes.

A national insolvency statistics portal could publish quarterly and annual data on new and closed cases, median and percentile duration, type of procedure, estate-size bands, cost bands, recovery bands, going-concern sales, approved plans and

²¹UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law; World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes.

²²Djankov et al. (2008); World Bank historical resolving-insolvency methodology.



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twelve- and twenty-four-month survival. Such reporting would improve policy evaluation, creditor pricing, judicial administration and academic research. It would also allow future international comparisons to rely more on observed case distributions and less on stylized scenarios.

4.4. Reform priorities derived from indicators

Indicators become useful only when they lead to causal investigation. If duration is high while cost is moderate, the relevant problem may be case management, service, valuation timelines or appeals. If cost is high while duration is short, remuneration structures, sale channels and formal requirements deserve scrutiny. If time and cost are acceptable but recovery is low, the cause may lie in late filing, pre-insolvency asset dissipation, weak secured-transactions enforcement or poor asset quality. If post-reorganization survival is low, viability screening and plan feasibility require attention.

This diagnostic approach limits score-oriented cosmetic reform. A shorter statutory deadline will not improve real duration if courts lack capacity to meet it. Increasing the number of reorganizations is not success if non-viable businesses are kept alive without sustainable cash flow. Each indicator should therefore be treated as a starting signal for legal, institutional and empirical analysis rather than as an end in itself.

5. Conclusion and Practical Proposals

The study confirms that insolvency-system effectiveness is inherently multidimensional. Duration and cost are necessary metrics but not sufficient ones. Creditor recovery should be evaluated as a net economic outcome after procedural friction and delay, while business preservation should measure the continuation of economically viable operations rather than formal survival of the



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debtor entity. The transition from Doing Business to B-READY is methodologically significant because the newer architecture distinguishes regulatory quality, institutional/public-service capacity and operational efficiency.

For Uzbekistan, B-READY 2025 provides a useful starting benchmark: in-court liquidation is reported at 8 months and 15 per cent of company market value, while in-court reorganization is reported at 14 months and 12 per cent. These numbers should begin rather than end domestic analysis. The proposed dashboard adds class-specific net recovery, going-concern preservation, dispersion and predictability, and twelve- and twenty-four-month post-proceeding viability.²³ Eight practical measures are proposed: (1) establish a unified national insolvency case-data standard; (2) publish liquidation and reorganization duration separately using medians and percentiles; (3) disaggregate procedural costs by category; (4) record creditor distributions by class and payment date; (5) publish rates of going-concern sales and successfully implemented reorganizations; (6) monitor twelve- and twenty-four-month post-reorganization survival; (7) connect B-READY institutional indicators to specific national reform projects; and (8) subject insolvency procedures to periodic evidence-based review. The objective should not be to maximize a single ranking score, but to build a predictable system that minimizes unnecessary value destruction while preserving fairness and economically viable activity.

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²³World Bank, B-READY 2025 – Uzbekistan: Business Insolvency Economy Profile.



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